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Abstract:   
In 2002 the Quebec government implemented the “Action Emploi” (AE) program aimed 
at making work pay for long-term social assistance recipients (SA). AE offered a 
generous wage subsidy that could last up to three years to recipients who found a full-
time job within twelve months. The program was implemented on an experimental basis 
for a single year. Based on little empirical evidence, a slightly modified version of the 
program was implemented on permanent basis in May 2008. 
 
The paper investigates the impact of the temporary program by focusing on the labour 
market transitions of the targeted population starting one year before the implementation 
of the program and up until the end of 2005. We use a multi-state multi-episode model. 
The endogeneity of the participation status is accounted for by treating AE as a distinct 
state and by allowing correlated unobserved factors to affect the transitions. The model 
is estimated by the method of simulated moments. Our results show that AE has indeed 
increased the duration of Off-SA spells and decreased the duration of SA spells slightly. 
There is also some evidence that the response to the program varies considerably with 
unobserved individual characteristics. 
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1 Introduction
In seeking to alleviate the problems that plague particularly disadvantaged groups when inte-
grating the labour market, governments have traditionally turned to skill enhancing training
programs. By enhancing skills, it was hoped that individuals would receive attractive job offers
and thus reduce their reliance on transfer programs. Over the past twenty years, the evaluation
literature has generally found training programs to have had limited success in achieving these
goals [see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a recent and detailed survey and Gilbert,
Kamionka and Lacroix (2001) for results pertaining to Canada]. Indeed, only very focused
programs targeted at specific groups seem to have had any significant impact on reliance to-
ward support programs. Yet, decrease in reliance has not generally translated into significant
reductions in poverty rates.
Many governments have responded to such deceptive results by shying away from tradi-
tional training programs and by focusing instead on policies that directly address the relative
(un)attractiveness of work. By directly subsidizing wage rates, it is believed many will be
induced to accept job offers that would not normally be good alternatives to transfer programs
such as social assistance (SA). Inducing individuals to work is motivated by two separate but
complementary goals. First, by raising total income such policies may be more effective at
addressing poverty than traditional programs. Second, holding a regular job may be conducive
to the acquisition of skills and attitudes that are necessary for self-reliance.
Making work pay can be achieved in various ways. In the United States and in the United
Kingdom, tax credits and other employment-conditional benefits designed to “make work pay”
for low-income workers have been in place for a number of years.1 One of the objectives of
earned income tax credits is to encourage SA recipients to engage in paid employment through
the provision of an earned income supplement that offsets the loss of benefits and/or increased
taxation and other costs associated with employment. In Canada, the Working Income Tax
Benefit (WITB) was introduced in March 2007. The WITB aims at improving the incentives
to work for low-income Canadians and to lower the so-called “welfare wall”. The program is a
refundable tax credit intended to provide tax relief for eligible working low income individuals
and families who are already in the workforce and to encourage others to enter the workforce.
The program thus shares many similarities with the EITC and the WFTC.
Prior to implementing the WITB, a policy aiming at helping single parents on social as-
sistance become self-reliant was implemented on an experimental basis. The Self-Sufficiency
Project (SSP) was a research and demonstration project that provided a generous, time-limited
earnings supplement to SA recipients who found a full-time job and left the rolls. Most
evaluations of the SSP have concluded that the program has had sizeable impacts on exits
from SA [Michalopoulos, Card, Gennetian, Harknett and Robins (2000), Quets, Robins, Paan,
Michalopoulos and Card (1999)]. Others have found the program beneficial to children [Morris
1The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program in the US and the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC)
in the UK.
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and Michalopoulos (2000)] and to have had ambiguous results on marital behaviour [Harknett
and Gennetian (2001)]. Yet, recent papers that use data for a longer period have found the
program to have had at best a temporary effect on SA exits [Card and Hyslop (2005)] or to
have had no impact at all once general equilibrium effects are accounted for [Lise, Seitz and
Smith (2005)].
Early results from the SSP prompted the Quebec government to implement the “Action
Emploi” (AE) program aimed at making work pay for long-term social assistance beneficiaries.
Like SSP, AE offered a generous wage subsidy to those recipients who left SA within twelve
months to take a full-time job. Like SSP, recipients were entitled to three years of benefits.
But unlike SPP, the subsidy was not proportional to earned income.2 The AE program was
implemented on an experimental basis for a single year.3 Very little research has looked into the
impact of the program on the employment history of the targeted population. Yet, a modified
version of the program was implemented on permanent basis in April 2008. The unique features
of AE (universal accessibility, large-scale program, substantial financial incentives, etc.) offer a
unique opportunity to document the impact of a SSP-like program on the response of long-term
heterogeneous groups of SA recipients in a “real-world” setting. The purpose or this paper is to
document the impact of a generous wage subsidy designed for long-term welfare recipients in the
Canadian context. We do this by modelling the main features of the program. We focus on the
transitions on the labour market starting one year before the implementation of the program
and up until the end of 2005. We use a multi-state multi-episode model. The endogeneity of
the participation status is accounted for by treating AE as a distinct state and by allowing
correlated unobserved factors to affect the transitions between different states. Our results
show that AE has indeed increased the duration of Off-SA spells and decreased the duration
of SA spells slightly. There is also some evidence that the response to the program varies
considerably with unobserved individual characteristics. Given that only 6% of the eligible
population actually participated in the program, one can conjecture that a larger participation
rate would have translated into larger program effects. This conjecture will eventually lend
itself to investigation as the new permanent program gets more widely known and as more
data become available.
2 The Action Emploi Program
The AE program was implemented on December 1st 2001. Income supplements were paid out
as early as January 1st 2002. The program targeted long-term SA recipients with little work
readiness and poor education. Thus to be eligible for AE, SA recipients had to have claimed
benefits for at least 36 months out of the last 45 prior to signing-up. Individuals could register
at any time between December 1st 2001 and November 30th 2002 if they met that requirement
2It has been argued that linking the subsidy to earned income may result in self-selection into the program.
See e.g. Brouillette and Lacroix (2008).
3Those who qualified within 12 months after the implementation of the program were entitled to three years
of benefits, i.e. until December 2005 at the latest.
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in any given month during that period. The figure below shows the two main periods of the
program. The first to register (early December 2001) could receive income supplements until
the end of November 2004. Those who registered last (end of November 2002) could receive
the supplement until the end of November 2005.
Figure 1: Action Emploi - Timeline
Entitlement (36 months)
31!12!200530!11!200430!11!200201!12!2001
Qualification (12 months)
To qualify for the benefits, SA recipients had to find a full-time job (130 hours per month)
and earn a gross wage that was at least equivalent to the minimum wage rate. The self-
employed were also eligible. To qualify, their net earnings had to be at least equivalent to a
full-time minimum wage job.4
Receipt of the earnings supplement was conditional on working at least 130 hours per
month. Those who did not meet the condition in any given month kept their entitlement
during a grace period that lasted up to four months. They were automatically disqualified if
they did not meet the requirement during the fourth month. Contrary to SSP, then benefits
were not tied to monthly earnings.5 Instead they were set to 390$/month during the first year
of eligibility, and to 260$/month and 130$/month in the second and third year of eligibility,
respectively.6
2.1 Characteristics of the AE participants and Empirical Evidence
In the months leading to the implementation of the program, SA recipients were sent a let-
ter along with their benefits that detailed the main parameters of the program. They were
4The thresholds were changed twice due to changes in the provincial minimum wage rate:
• 910$: December 1st 2001 – September 30th 2002 (130× 7.00$).
• 936$: October 1st 2002 – January 31st 2003 (130× 7.20$).
• 949$: February 1st 2003 – (130× 7.30$).
5In the SSP, the benefits are roughly equivalent to: B = 0.50 × (37, 500$ − wh), where w is the hourly
wage rate and h is the annual hours of work. Consequently the benefits are a decreasing function of earnings.
This may generate serious self-selection problems in the experiment. See Brouillette and Lacroix (2008) and
Kamionka and Lacroix (2009).
6This is more or less equivalent to 43%, 28% and 14% of a full-time minimum wage job in each of the
entitlement years. The program that was implemented in April 2008 is know as “Supple´ment a` la prime au
travail ”. It provides a monthly supplement of 200$ for a maximum of 12 months to SA recipients who work
full-time and had a cumulative stay of 36 months over the last 42 prior to finding a job.
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also reminded about the program whenever they met with their caseload worker. According
to government reports, 13,244 SA recipients signed-up for AE between December 2001 and
November 2002. The table below shows the main characteristics of the participants. The
majority are either singles or single parents. They are also relatively poorly educated. Over
75% of the participants have earned at most a high-school degree. The last panel of the table
also indicates that the vast majority have very little attachment to the labour market. Indeed
nearly 44% of the participants have had cumulative stays on SA of between 4 and 10 years
prior to their participation, and over 48% of them have had cumulative stays of over 10 years.
Table 1: Characteristics of the AE participants
Type of household # individuals Proportion
Singles 5,984 45.2
Single parents 4,118 31.3
Couples, no children 727 5.5
Couples, children 2,271 17.1
Unknown 144 1.1
Schooling
Primary 660 5.0
Secondary (incomplete) 6,167 46.6
Secondary (completed) 3,495 26.4
Post-secondary 1,302 9.8
University 792 6.0
Unknown 828 6.2
Cumulative months on SA
36–47 921 7.0
48–119 5,847 44.1
120 + 6,342 47.9
Unknown 134 1.0
Source: Direction ge´ne´rale de la recherche, de
l’e´valuation et de la statistique, MSSS, 2003.
The empirical analysis is based on the administrative records of the Ministe`re de l’emploi
et de la Solidarite´ sociale du Que´bec (MESS). The data span the period from January 2000
until December 2005. The files include detailed information on household type, number of
children, region of residence, gender, schooling, birthplace, and monthly indicators on SA/AE
participation.
We focus exclusively on single parents to allow a comparison with SSP. The files show that
over 51,118 single parents satisfied the requirements for AE at the time of its implementation.
In all, 3,807 individuals qualified for benefits.7 The main statistical features of our sample
are reported in Table 2. Interestingly, there are very few noteworthy differences between
participants and non-participants. Both groups are thus composed almost entirely of women
born in Canada and who have approximately the same number of children. Participants
are slightly younger and more educated. Likewise, the geographical distribution of the two
7The are 4,118 single parents in the administrative files. A total of 311 observations are omitted due to
missing data.
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groups is very similar, albeit the fact that proportionally fewer participants live in the Greater
Montreal area.
Table 2: Sample Characteristics
Variable AE Non-AE
Mean Std Mean Std
Err Err
Age 33.712 7.772 35.107 9.647
Education 11.054 2.236 10.374 2.590
Number of children 1.586 0.870 1.520 0.871
Gender (1=Female) 0.879 0.326 0.870 0.337
Born in Canada 0.816 0.387 0.816 0.387
Region of residence
Bas St-Laurent 0.025 0.019
Saguenay - Lac St-Jean 0.040 0.039
Capitale-Nationale 0.093 0.070
Mauricie 0.078 0.067
Estrie 0.049 0.033
Montre´al 0.179 0.255
Outaouais 0.038 0.044
Abitibi-Te´miscamingue 0.022 0.022
Coˆte-Nord 0.018 0.015
Nord du Que´bec 0.002 0.003
Gaspe´sie - Iles de la Madeleine 0.029 0.020
Chaudie`re -Appalaches 0.029 0.027
Laval 0.024 0.030
Lanaudie`re 0.062 0.046
Laurentides 0.071 0.052
Monte´re´gie 0.150 0.141
Centre du Que´bec 0.011 0.007
Montre´al banlieue 0.083 0.109
Number of observations 3 807 47 311
Despite the two groups being observationally very similar, the differences between the two
groups are nevertheless statistically significant. Table 3 reports the results of fitting a simple
probit regression of AE participation. It turns out most parameters are highly statistically
significant and corroborate the findings of Table 2. In particular, participation increases with
education and decreases with age. Likewise, participation rates are everywhere higher than in
the metropolitan area of Montreal. These results suggest that participation in AE must be
conditioned on observed characteristics.
2.2 Transitions on the labour market
Individual histories are derived from administrative records. Our analysis starts in January
2000, one year prior to the implementation of AE. Four different states on the labour market can
be determined from the data: (1) Off-SA; (2) SA; (3) AE; (4) AE-SA. Off-SA simply refers to
not being on the rolls. Individuals in this situation may be employed, ineligible for SA benefits,
or may be collecting employment insurance benefits. SA and AE are mutually exclusive states.
Finally AE-SA refers to the grace period, i.e. to AE participants who are unemployed in a
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Table 3: Probit Regression: AE Participation
Variable Marginal T-Stat P-Value
Effect
(∂Φ/∂X)
Age -0.001 -9.06 0.000
Education 0.008 16.48 0.000
Number of Children 0.007 5.69 0.000
Gender (1=Female) 0.005 1.58 0.114
Born in Canada -0.003 -0.91 0.362
Region of residence (Montreal omitted)
Bas St-Laurent 0.060 6.00 0.000
Saguenay - Lac St-Jean 0.032 4.53 0.000
Capitale-Nationale 0.053 9.38 0.000
Mauricie 0.042 7.40 0.000
Estrie 0.063 8.24 0.000
Outaouais 0.017 2.55 0.011
Abitibi-Te´miscamingue 0.029 3.19 0.001
Coˆte-Nord 0.050 4.46 0.000
Nord du Que´bec -0.000 -0.01 0.995
Gaspe´sie - Iles de la Madeleine 0.069 7.09 0.000
Chaudie`re -Appalaches 0.036 4.34 0.000
Laval 0.008 1.03 0.305
Lanaudie`re 0.056 8.43 0.000
Laurentides 0.056 8.84 0.000
Monte´re´gie 0.032 7.48 0.000
Centre du Que´bec 0.060 3.96 0.000
Montre´al banlieue 0.004 0.88 0.379
Log likelihood -13,230.965
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given month but who are still eligible for benefits. Recall that the grace period may only last
for a maximum of four months. From these four states, as many as twelve different transitions
can potentially be observed. All spells are censored in December 2005. Tables 4 and 5 report
the observed transitions for participants and non-participants separately. Non-participants can
only be observed transiting between Off-SA and SA. The upper panel of Table 4 focuses on
spells that were ongoing in January 2000. Over 6,176 individuals who were originally in the
Off-SA state moved into SA within 12.9 months on average. On the other hand, over 22,359
individuals transited from SA into Off-SA within 39.6 months on average. Of greater concern
is the fact that close to 46% (18,776/41,135) of those who were SA beneficiaries in January
2000 were still claiming benefits in December 2005. The lower panel of the table reports the
frequency of subsequent transitions. Overall, the non-participants have experienced on average
1.62 transitions on the labour market.
Table 5 reports similar frequencies for participants over the same period. Of the 2,470
individuals on SA in January 2000, 967 moved directly into AE, while another 203 moved
directly into AE-SA.8 The lower panel of the table shows a lot of movement between the
different states. Participants have thus experienced 4.5 transitions on average over the period
of analysis.
Table 4: Sample Transition Frequencies : Non-Participants
(a) Initial spell
Destination state
State of origin Off-SA SA Cen (Dec 05) Marginal Duration†
Off-SA — 6,176 0 6,176 12.9
SA 22,359 — 18,776 41,135 39.6
Marginal 22,359 6,176 18,776 47,311
(b) Subsequent spells
Destination state
State of origin Off-SA SA Cen (Dec 05) Marginal Duration†
Off-SA — 27,289 16,122 43,411 13.5
SA 21,052 — 12,413 33,465 20.6
Marginal 21,052 27,289 28,535 76,876
† Censoring not accounted for.
To help make sense of these tables, Figure 2 depicts the smoothed hazard rates of the
transitions between SA and Off-SA for both participants and non-participants. No distinction
is made between pre and post AE and the calculations are based on the second and subsequent
spells only to avoid left-censored spells. According to the figure, participants have both lower
transition rates between Off-SA and SA and higher transitions rates between SA and Off-
SA.9 It would thus be tempting to conclude that the program decreases the proportion of
time spent on SA. Yet the hazard functions do not distinguish between pre and post AE
8Those who moved into AE-SA were simultaneously receiving SA benefits and working too few hours to
qualify for AE.
9The null assumption that the underlying survival functions are identical in both figures is strongly rejected.
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Table 5: Sample Transition Frequencies : Participants
(a) Initial spell
Destination state
State of origin Off-SA SA AE AE-SA Cen (Dec 05) Marginal Duration†
Off-SA — 165 2 0 0 167 3.8
SA 2,470 — 967 203 0 3,640 22.6
Marginal 2,470 165 969 203 0 3,807
(b) Subsequent spells
Destination state
State of origin Off-SA SA AE AE-SA Cen (Dec 05) Marginal Duration†
Off-SA — 3,214 2,080 30 2,776 8,100 8.9
SA 2,567 — 435 90 830 3,922 9.7
AE 2,989 71 — 807 197 4,064 18.4
AE-SA 74 472 580 — 4 1,130 2.4
Marginal 5,630 3,757 3,095 927 3807 17,216
† Censoring not accounted for.
participation, nor do they account for potential selection into AE. Thus only an in-depth
econometric analysis can measure precisely the contribution of the AE program on the relative
attachment of participants to the labour market. In particular, a multi-state multi-episode
model will allow us to determine the “steady-state” proportion of time spent on and off SA
for participants and non-participants alike [see Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (2002), Bonnal,
Fouge`re and Se´randon (1997), and Gilbert et al. (2001)].
Figure 2: Smoothed empirical hazard rates
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3 The econometric model
Multi-state multi-episode models are well suited to address the potential problem of endogenous
participation in AE.10 Furthermore, once the entitlement phase ends, and given participation
was properly modelled, the subsequent transitions can be conditioned on past participation.
The model can thus determine the extent to which post-program durations on and off SA are
affected by AE. The identification of the AE effect rests on the presence of a control group
composed of those who did qualify but did not participate.
Each individual in our sample qualified for AE at the time of its implementation in De-
cember 2001. Figure 3 below depicts the work history of hypothetical non-participants and
participants, respectively. The dashed vertical lines delimit the period of observation. The left
hand-side figure shows that a typical non-participant will be observed in the SA state at the
beginning of January 2000. The spell is left-censored as we only observe the residual duration
that lasts up until June 2001, say.11 She then leaves SA for approximately 33 months, and
then returns to SA until the end of December 2005. All spells are right censored in December
2005. The typical participant exhibits similar transitions. Upon leaving SA she enters AE for
approximately 10 months. She loses her job and transits into the SA-AE state for 3 months.
Upon finding a new job, she returns to AE for a spell of about 2 years. She next returns to
SA for a short period and moves into Off-SA until the end of the period of observation.
Figure 3: Employment history of hypothetical non-participants and participants
Off−SA
J−00 J−01 J−02 J−03 J−05 J06J−04
SA SA
SA−AE
J−00 J−01 J−02 J−03 J−05 J06J−04
SA SA
Off−SA
AE AE
The figure illustrates the complexity of individual histories. It also underscores the many
statistical challenges that must be tackled. Indeed, the potential self-selectivity into AE must
be accounted for. In addition, the model must take into account the finite duration of the
AE program as well as that of the grace period (AE-SA). In both cases, termination involves
a discontinuity in the exit rate and a discrete decision to move into a new state. Finally,
10Despite the fact that over 3,807 single parents participated, as many as 47,311 did not. Observed and
unobserved differences could be important determinants of participation. In particular, only those who met
their caseload worker or who spent time reading the relevant documentation may have been aware of the
existence of the program. These individuals may differ from the others in different aspects.
11Left-censored spells are denoted as “Incomplete” or “Interrupted” in what follows.
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left-censored spells must be treated carefully. Different alternatives exist but none are entirely
satisfactory. We could for instance focus on the transitions that occur after the implementation
of the AE program. This would solve the problem for the participants but not for the non-
participants. Instead we define separate hazard functions for interrupted and completed spells
and we model the initial condition explicitly [see Heckman and Singer (1984) and Ham and
LaLonde (1996)].
3.1 Modelling transition intensities
Let m denote the number of observed episodes for each individuals (note that m is a random
variable). Each episode is characterized by its duration and the state that succeeds it (desti-
nation state). In our case, four different states may be observed (SA, Off-SA, AE, AE-SA).
Write the endogenous variables as (δ1,, r1), (δ2, r2), . . . , (δmrm), where δj is the duration of the
jth episode and rj is the destination state that brings it to an end.
We use a conventional multi-state multi-episode model that specifies the joint distribution
of the m continuous and discrete variables (δj , rj), j = 1, . . .m [see Lawless (2003), Mealli
and Pudney (2003)]. More precisely, let f(δj , rj |Xj , ν) be the joint density of the duration
and destination state of the jth spell. The density is conditional on a vector of observed
characteristics which may include earlier state and duration variables to allow for lagged state
dependence.12 The variables are all spell-specific and are assumed constant over the duration
of a given spell. The term ν is a vector of unobserved individual random effects that are
constant over time. This constancy is likely to generate serial dependance in the sequence of
episodes.
The last observed spell is still in progress in December 2005. For this censored spell, the
duration and the destination state are unknown. Its distribution is thus characterized by a
survivor function, S(δm|Xm, ν), which gives the conditional probability that the mth spell lasts
at least δm months. Finally, as mentioned above, the density function of the initial spell is
estimated separately from the the density of the subsequent spells to account for left-censoring.
We thus write f0(·) and S0(·) for the initial spell and f1(·) and S1(·) for subsequent spells.
Conditional on the observed covariates, X = {X0, X1, X2, . . . , Xm}, and the unobserved effects,
12See Doiron and Gorgens (2008) for a recent and in-depth analysis of state dependance in labour market
outcomes.
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ν, the joint distribution of r0, δ1,, r1, δ2, r2, . . . , δm, rm, is given by:
f(r0, δ1, r1, . . . , δm, fm) = Pr(r0|X0, ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸×{f0(δ1, r1|X1, ν)1−cS0(δ1|X1, ν)c}︸ ︷︷ ︸×
(a) (b)m−2∏
j=2
f1(δj , rj |Xj , ν)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
×S1(δm|Xm, ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (1)
(c) (d)
The expression (a) describes the probability of observing the initial state (Off-SA or SA). The
term (b) is the density of the first spell. If the episode is not right-censored, then c = 0,
otherwise c = 1.13 Thus non-participants who experiment only one episode are both left and
right-censored and contribute S0(δ1|x1) to the likelihood function. The expression (c) is the
joint density of all intermediate spells. Finally, the expression (d) is the survivor function for
the ultimate spell.
The transition components of the model [Pr(·), f(·) and S(·)] are based on destination-
specific transition intensity functions. These give the instantaneous probability of exit to a
specific destination at a particular time conditional on no previous exit having occurred. Thus,
for a given episode, and irrespective of the state of origin, the transition intensity function into
state “l”, λl(t|X, ν), is given by:
Pr(r = l, δ ∈ (t, t+ dt)|δ ≥ t,X, ν) = λl(t|X, ν)dt,
where X is spell-specific as mentioned above. The administrative data is constructed in such a
way that a given episode can never be observed to be followed by an episode of the same type.
The joint probability of exit route l and duration δ is given by:
fn(l, δ|X, ν) = λnl (δ|X, ν) exp
−∑
j 6=l
Inj (δ|X, ν)
 , (2)
where Inj (δ|X, ν) is the jth integrated hazard:
Inj =
∫ δ
0
λnj (t|X, ν)dt, n = {0, 1},
where n indexes the functions according to whether they apply to the first or subsequent spells.
Because the random effects, ν, are unobserved it must be integrated out of the likelihood
13Recall from Table 4 that the first spell of a significant proportion of non-participants is right-censored.
11
function. The unconditional likelihood function can thus be written as:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
ln
{∫
Pr(r0|X0, ν)×
{
f0(δ1, r1|X1, ν)1−cS0(δ1|X1, ν)c
}× (3)m−2∏
j=2
f1(δj , rj |Xj , ν)
× S1(δm|Xm, ν)dG(ν)
 ,
where G(ν) is the distribution function of ν.
3.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
The next issue that must be addressed to make the model amenable to estimation is to specify
the manner in which unobserved heterogeneity enters the above specification. Most applica-
tions rely on the work of Heckman and Singer (1984) and approximate arbitrary continuous
distributions using a finite number of mass points [see Gritz (1993), Ham and Rea (1987),
Doiron and Gorgens (2008)]. A number of recent papers use flexible specifications that allow
the heterogeneity terms to be correlated across states [see Ham and LaLonde (1996), Eberwein
et al. (2002)]. These specifications are sometimes referred to as single or double-factor loading
distributions and are also based on a finite set of mass points.
Our setting involves four distinct states. In addition, we distinguish between complete
and incomplete SA and Off-SA spells, we control for the initial condition and allow for a
discontinuity in the AE-SA state (see below). The above approach is impractical in our setting
as it would involve too many parameters. Instead we use a two-factor specification, where each
of the two random effects are constant over time and linked to a particular state of origin rather
than destination. To fix ideas, let ν = (ν1, . . . , νK) be a vector of unobserved heterogeneity
variables, with νk an origin-specific component (k = 1, . . . ,K). Ideally, the joint distribution of
the unobserved heterogeneity terms should not be independent. Consider a two-factor loading
model [see Van den Berg (1997)] such that
νk = exp(θ1kξ1 + θ
2
kξ2), (4)
where νk is the random effect associated with state k, θ1k and θ
2
k are loading factors for state
k, and ξ1 and ξ2 are independent random draws from the standard normal distribution.14 To
insure identification of the parameters, we impose θ1k = 1, k ≥ 2 and θ2k = 1, k = 1. It can
easily be shown that the correlation between log(νk) and log(νl) is given by:
ρkl =
θ1kθ
1
l + θ
2
kθ
2
l√
(θ1k)
2 + (θ1k)
2
√
(θ2k)
2 + (θ2k)
2
. (5)
14A similar approach has been used by Bonnal et al. (1997), Mealli and Pudney (2003) and Gilbert et al.
(2001).
12
A positive correlation between states k and l indicates that unobserved characteristics that
favour a (conditionally on X) high exit rate from state k are likely to favour a high exit rate
from state l as well.
3.3 Initial state
Recall from Tables 4 and 5 that individuals in our sample are observed in state Off-SA or SA
in January 2000. We model the initial state indicator as a binomial logit structure:
Pr(r0 = SA|X0, ν0) = exp(X0γ0 + ν0)1 + exp(X0γ0 + ν0) , (6)
where γ0 is an appropriately dimensioned vector of parameters and ν0 is a heterogeneity term
that is specific to the logit component. The parameter vector associated with Off-SA is im-
plicitly normalized to zero. The probability of the initial state is thus correlated to the other
states through the unobserved heterogeneity term.
3.4 Specification of transition intensity functions
The model involves a large number of potential transitions. Ideally, we should estimate a
set of parameters for each origin-destination combination. Likewise, the transition intensity
functions should we as flexible as possible. Non-parametric specifications are the most flexible
but they entail many parameters. They are useful when studying single spells data. But in our
context they simply are not practical. Our strategy consists in estimating destination-specific
transition intensity functions. We allow the intensity functions into SA and Off-SA to depend
on past AE participation through dummy variables. We make a distinction between complete
and incomplete program participation as there is some evidence that early termination may
have either a positive or negative impact on future spell durations [see Mealli, Pudney and
Thomas (1996)]. The basic specification we use is the log-logistic form:
λl =
exp(Xlβl + νl)κlαltαl−1
1 + exp(Xlβl + νl)κltαl
, (7)
where Xl is a row-vector of observable characteristics (including possibly past AE participa-
tion), βl is an appropriately dimensioned destination-specific vector of parameters, and κl and
αl are destination-specific parameters. The associated survivor function is given by:
Sl =
1
1 + exp(Xlβl + νl)κltαl
. (8)
The log-logistic form is flexible enough to allow a non-monotone hazard.15
15Gritz (1993) also uses a log-logistic specification.
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One special feature of AE calls for a modification of the traditional transition model out-
lined above. Recall that individuals are allowed not to meet the program’s requirement for
a maximum of four months. On the fourth month they lose eligibility and most either move
into Off-SA or SA. We must thus allow for a discontinuity in the destination state probabilities
conditional on the “grace period” having ended. The transition structure operates normally
until the limit is reached, at which point a separate logistic model comes into play.16 Thus,
for an exhausted AE-SA spell,
Pr(r = SA|X, ν0) = exp(XγGP + ν0)1 + exp(XγGP + ν0)
. (9)
This specification is identical to the initial condition logit. Because relatively few individuals
exhaust the grace period, we assume that the heterogeneity term is the same as that of the
initial condition logit but we allow the slope parameters, γGP , to differ. Furthermore, the
parameter vector associated with Off-SA is implicitly normalized to zero.
The main problem with the estimation of the likelihood function (3) is the integration of the
unobserved heterogeneity. Let lˆi(νh) denote the contribution of individual i to the likelihood
function for a given draw νh = νh1 , ν
h
2 , . . . , ν
h
K . The log-likelihood we maximize is the following:
l̂nL =
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1
H
H∑
h=1
lˆi(νh)
)
, (10)
where H is the number of draws. The maximization of the simulated likelihood function yields
consistent and efficient parameter estimates if
√
N/H → 0 when H → +∞ and N → +∞
[see Gourie´roux and Monfort(1991, 1996)]. While the literature has established that H = 20
appears adequate [see Laroque and Salanie´ (1993), Kamionka (1998)], we have chosen H = 100
instead.17
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimates of the slope parameters are reported in Table 6. The first column of the table
reports the parameters of the initial state logit model. The parameters must be interpreted
as the impact of the associated variables on the probability of being in SA in January 2000
relative to being in Off-SA. According to the table, the probability of being initially on SA
16No such adjustment need be made to the duration of AE despite its limited duration because at exhaustion
every spell systematically transits into Off-SA. Mealli et al. (1996) were the first to propose to modify the model
in this manner to account for an exogenous limit on duration.
17The slope parameters are relatively insensitive to the number of draws we use. The loading factors, on the
other hand, vary considerably when we increase H from 10 to 40. They stabilize once we reach H = 50.
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increases with age, being female, having more children, being born in Canada, and living in
Montreal. Not surprisingly, more schooling increases the probability of being off the rolls.
Columns (2)–(8) report the parameter estimates of observed characteristics on the destination-
specific intensity functions. Columns (2)–(4) relate to the first (incomplete) spell, i.e. f0(·),
whereas columns (5)–(8) relate to subsequent spells, i.e. f1(·). The parameter estimates can
be read pairwise. For instance, columns (2) and (5) focus on the impact of observed charac-
teristics on the transitions into Off-SA. The sign of each parameter remains the same in both
columns, but their magnitude increases substantially in the complete spells. Irrespective of
the state of origin, it is found that more schooling increases the transitions into Off-SA. On
the other hand, older individuals and larger families appear to have lower transition rates.
While Gender and Born in Canada have no statistically significant impacts on transitions into
Off-SA during the first spell, they both have a negative and highly significant impact on the
subsequent spells.
A similar comparison between columns (3) and (6) reveals interesting results. When tran-
siting into SA, Gender, Born in Canada and Montreal have essentially the same parameter
estimates in the incomplete and complete spells specifications. On the other hand, Age and
Schooling have opposite signs and both remain highly statistically significant. This is the only
case in which we observe a sign reversal of statistically significant parameters. Note that Age
has a negative parameter estimate in each destination of the complete spells specifications.
This essentially means that the duration in the states of origin tends to increase with age.
Conversely, because Schooling has a positive sign in each destination of the complete spells, it
follows that the duration in the states of origin all tend decrease with schooling.
The transitions into AE [columns (4) and (7)] yield qualitatively similar results to those
found in Table 3 using a simple probit model. They show that participation in AE increases
with schooling but decreases with age. Furthermore, individuals living in Montreal have a lower
transition rate into AE. The last column of the table reports the results of fitting a simple logit
model on the exit route once the grace period ends. Unfortunately, the model is incapable of
predicting the type of transition as very few parameters are statistically significant.
The next panel of the table reports the impact of past AE participation on SA and Off-SA
spells. The first line relates to incomplete participation (less than 3 years) while the second line
focuses on completed spells.18 The parameters measure the impact of AE on the transitions
between SA and Off-SA once participation as been terminated or has reached the time limit.
Early termination may result from lower attachment to the labour market. Because we use
administrative data, we do not know that exact status of a participant who has left AE for
Off-SA. Consequently, the impact of incomplete program participation on Off-SA duration can
not be signed unambiguously a priori. Likewise, early termination does not necessarily lead
to longer subsequent SA spells and/or shorter Off-SA spells. The limited work experience
that was gained during participation may still be beneficial in the post-participation period.
18Only 197 AE spells were ongoing in December 2005. Furthermore, only 1,019 participants have had cumu-
lative stays of 36 months (26.7%).
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For similar reasons, the impact of complete participation can not be signed unambiguously a
priori. Given their limited skills, participants may find it difficult to receive attractive wage
offers. Their participation in AE may be tied to a job that conceivably offers very little in
terms of skills enhancement. The loss of the wage subsidy at the end of the eligibility period
may induce them to move back to SA and behave like non-participants.19
The parameter estimates tell an interesting story. To start with, early termination of AE
has a positive effect on the transition rates into Off-SA and a negative one on those into
SA. Thus participants who leave the program prematurely will spend on average a greater
proportion of time off SA than non-participants. Program completion, on the other hand,
yields ambiguous results. The transitions into Off-SA and SA are both lower than those
observed for non-participants. Because the relation between the duration in a given state and
the parameters is highly non-linear, the marginal impact of program completion can not be
ascertained by inspection of the their magnitude alone. Simulations must be used to determine
their mean impact.
The next line of the table reports the loading factors, i.e. θ1k and θ
2
k from equation (4).
Recall that these parameters are origin-specific and affect the exit rate from a given state.
To ease interpretation, we report the correlation matrix that is implicitly defined by these
parameters [see equation (5)] for the complete spells. Nearly all the correlations are statistically
significant, save for the correlation between SA and AE-SA. Thus, conditional on observed
characteristics X, individuals who are likely to have long Off-SA spells are also likely to have
long SA spells and long AE spells. As a matter of fact, the correlation between Off-SA and
SA is 0.992. This is consistent with the idea that some may cycle relatively rapidly between
SA and Off-SA while others have longer cycles.
Table 7 reports the shape parameter of the transition intensity functions. The top panel
reports the parameter estimates of αl while the bottom panel reports those of κl. Figures
4 and 5 plot various transition intensity functions based on these parameter estimates. The
functions are plotted for the average-modal individual in our sample.20 Figure 4 focuses on
the first spell while Figure 5 focuses on subsequent spells. The flexibility of the log-logistic
specification is readily apparent from these figures. Monotonically increasing and decreasing,
as well as non-monotonic functions, can result from this particular functional form.
The transition between Off-SA and SA during the first spell increases dramatically in the
first few months of 2001. Recall that each individual in our sample qualified for AE when the
program was initiated in December 2001. This sharp increase may be indirect evidence that
some were induced to move back onto the rolls to establish their eligibility (36 out of the last
45 months on the rolls). This somewhat contrasts with the results from the SSP experiment.
Indeed, SSP sampled individuals who were either entering SA or who were already on the rolls.
A main concern with the experiment was to the extent to which individuals would delay their
19This is essentially what was found in the SSP experiment. See Card and Hyslop (2005).
20The average-modal individual is female, born in Canada, lives in Montreal, has 1.5 children and 10.5 years
of schooling.
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exit from SA in order to qualify for the benefits. Data from the Applicant Study found very
little evidence of delayed exit behaviour [see Card and Hyslop (2005), Kamionka and Lacroix
(2009)]. Our results are more in line with Moffitt (1996) who conjectured that the provision
of high quality training programs to welfare recipients may result in increased caseloads. Yet
given the small participation rate in AE, the program is unlikely solely responsible for the
large increase into SA in the months that proceeded its implementation. The vertical lines
Figure 4: Simulated Transition Intensities – First Spell
0
0
.002
.0
02
4
.0
04
SA->AE
SA
->
AE
0
5
.0
5
1
.1
.1
5
Off-SA & Off-SA->SA
SA
->
Of
f-S
A 
& 
Of
f-S
A-
>S
A
0
20
20
4
40
6
60
8
80
Months since January 2001
Months since January 2001
Off-S  -> SA
Off-SA -> SA
 O f-SA
SA-> Off-SA
AE
SA-> AE
( Mean Model Type)
( Mean-Model Type)
imulate Transition Intensities: First Spell
Simulated Transition Intensities: First Spell
correspond to the twelve-month period during which individuals had to find a full-time job to
qualify for AE. The hazard rates between SA and AE correspond to the dotter line and are
scaled on the right hand-side of the figure. They vary between 0.001 and 0.0035 per month
and yield an overall participation rate of about 2.5% over the 12-month period. This is very
close to the number of such transitions that occurred during the first spell (967 out of 51,118
individuals). The upward sloping transition rates into AE is consistent with a decreasing
reservation wage as the time limit to qualify approaches.21
Figure 5 reports the transition rates between Off-SA and SA for fresh spells. The transitions
between the two states are drawn according to the participation status in AE. We distinguish
between non-participation, incomplete participation and complete participation. The figure
on the left depicts the transition rates between Off-SA and SA. The slopes are very similar to
the empirical hazard rates reported in Figure 2. Interestingly, non-participants have the lowest
transition rates, followed by those who dropped out of the program early. Completion of AE
is found to decrease the likelihood of moving back onto the rolls substantially. The figure on
the right-hand side focuses on the transitions between SA and Off-SA. The exit rates are much
lower than those reported in Figure 2. This is because the latter figure is based on fresh spells
and thus omits the numerous left-censored spells. The spells are consequently heavily skewed
21If we assume that individuals follow a reservation wage strategy in deciding to leave SA, then it is relatively
easy to show that the reservation wage decreases as the time limit to qualify for AE approaches. See Card and
Hyslop (2005) and Brouillette and Lacroix (2008).
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toward short durations. The simulated transition intensities present interesting features. First,
Figure 5: Simulated Transition Intensities – Fresh Spells
.01
.0
1
2
.0
2
3
.0
3
4
.0
4
5
.0
5
Transition Intensities
Tr
an
sit
io
n 
Int
en
sit
ies
0
0
20
20
4
40
6
60
8
80
Mo ths since January 2001
Months since January 2001
N n-Participant
Non-Participant
C mplete AE
Complete AE
Incomplete AE
Incomplete AE
(Fre h Spells, Me n-Model Type)
(Fresh Spells, Mean-Model Type)
Si ula d Transition Int nsities: Off-SA -> SA
Simulated Transition Intensities: Off-SA -> SA
0
0
.002
.0
02
4
.0
04
6
.0
06
Transition Intensities
Tr
an
sit
io
n 
Int
en
sit
ies
0
20
20
4
40
6
60
8
80
Mo ths since January 2001
Months since January 2001
N n-Participant
Non-Participant
C mplete AE
Complete AE
Incomplete AE
Incomplete AE
(Fre h Spells, Me n-Model Type)
(Fresh Spells, Mean-Model Type)
Si ula d Transition Int nsities: SA->Off-SA
Simulated Transition Intensities: SA->Off-SA
they are relatively flat. This is due to the fact that αl is close to unity and κl is close to zero.
Second, incomplete participation is associated with the highest transition rate between SA and
Off-SA. Finally, non-participants have higher transition rates than participants who were on
AE for three years.
4.2 Simulation Strategy
Figure 5 provides mixed evidence on the potential impact of AE on total time spent on and
off SA. In addition, the model structure is sufficiently complex that the parameter estimates
can not be interpreted directly. To better understand their meaning, it is best to turn to sim-
ulations. These are performed for the same hypothetical individual as above, that is someone
who is average with respect to quantitative attributes and modal with respect to qualitative
ones. We generate 1,000 six-year work histories via stochastic simulations of the model. These
are summarized by computing the average proportion of time spent in each of the four po-
tential states we have considered. To control for endogenous participation in AE, we set the
random variables to their mean value (zero). The first set of simulations explores the effects
of the covariates by considering slightly different characteristics from the baseline individual.
The second set focuses on the unobserved heterogeneity. We once again simulate the work
history of the hypothetical individual but vary the random variables while maintaining the
characteristics constant.
The algorithm works as follows. The parameters of the initial condition logit are used to
determine the initial state. Conditional on the initial state, we next calculate the duration
of the three potential transitions (Off-SA → SA, SA → Off-SA, SA → AE) and select the
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shortest.22 The SA → AE transition must be the shortest and occur between months 12 and
24 to be selected, as prescribed by the program. Once the transition type is determined, the
parameter estimates of the subsequent spells are used to determine the next transitions until
the simulated history spans a total of six years, with the last spell censored. The simulations
generate work histories that are comparable to those of Tables 4 and 5, albeit the fact they
are conducted on a hypothetical individual and do not account for the sample variability in
observed characteristics.
Table 8 reports the main findings. The top panel reports the effect of changing the age
of the benchmark individual while maintaining the other characteristics constant. As the
individual ages, the mean duration of the Off-SA spells increases significantly while that of the
SA spells remain stable. As a result, the proportion of time on SA decreases slightly with age.
Interestingly, the model predicts a participation rate of approximately 6%, a figure remarkably
close to the observed proportion. Finally, the number of spells over the course of six years is
insensitive to age. The second panel of the table focuses on education. We vary the number
of years of schooling from 10 to 18. High-school completion entails 12 years of schooling while
a university degree more or less corresponds to 17 or 18 years. The simulations show that the
duration of SA and Off-SA spells decrease with schooling. As schooling increases individuals
transit more rapidly between the two states but the overall proportion of time spent in each of
them remains relatively constant. Increases in the number of children lengthen the duration of
Off-SA spells and have no impact on the duration of SA spells. Consequently, the proportion
of time spent on SA decreases by approximately two percentage points.
While the above changes appear to be relatively small, they need be put into perspective.
Recall that only 6% of SA recipients participate in AE. To look further into this issue, we sim-
ulate the likely situation of our benchmark individual in the absence of the AE program. Such
a counterfactual is obtained by eliminating the transitions into AE and by setting the random
components to their mean value to avoid the problems of endogenous selection. Table 9 reports
the results of simulating the work histories by educational attainment with and without AE. In
the world with AE, we only consider spells that occur after the end of AE when computing the
mean durations. Thus conditional on participation having ended, we simulate six more years of
history so that participants and non-participants may be compared appropriately. Panels (A)
and (B) of Table 9 report the simulation results. The difference between the two are shown in
panel (C). In general, it is found that the AE program decreases the proportion of time spent
on SA by individuals with average educational attainment. Individuals with very low or very
high schooling are found to increase their reliance on SA. As shown in the table, the change
in the proportion of time on SA varies between -1.8 and 0.8 percentage points.
The above simulations are all conducted under the assumption that the unobserved hetero-
geneity components are fixed at their mean value of zero and are cast within a six-year time
frame. The model can also be used to simulate the sensitivity of the work history with respect
22We sample from the type I extreme value for the logit parts of the model, and from the distribution of
the latent duration for the transition part. The inverse of the relevant cumulative density function is evaluated
using uniform pseudo-random numbers.
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to the unobserved heterogeneity. We once again consider our representative individual and
investigate the consequences of varying the unobserved heterogeneity associated with Off-SA
between -2 and 2 standard errors around its mean. Rather than simulating the work history
over a six-year time frame, we focus on the duration of fresh SA and Off-SA spells conditional
on past AE status. We do this simply by letting the relevant dummy variables equal one or zero
as need be. Figure 6 depicts the expected duration of both SA and Off-SA spells. Recall from
Figure 6: Expected Duration of Fresh Spells, by Heterogeneity Group
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Table 6 that the unobserved heterogeneity components between SA and Off-SA are positively
correlated and that the components are origin-specific. A low realization of the unobserved
component, ν, will on average decrease both the exit rates from SA and Off-SA and therefore
increase the duration. Interestingly, the figure shows that the relation between the duration in
both states is not linear. An increase in the unobserved component decreases the duration of
Off-SA spells dramatically. Note that the general pattern is consistent with the simulated tran-
sition intensities reported in Figure 5: Non-participants have the shortest duration, followed
by incomplete participation and complete participation. The mean duration of Off-SA spells
is much greater than the sample mean because the spells are not censored. On the other hand,
as the unobserved component increases, the duration of the SA spells increases and reaches it
maximum value at the mean value of zero for non-participants and early dropouts.
Individuals who remained on AE for three years have a very distinctive behaviour. For
very low values of ν, they have the longest Off-SA spells and the shortest SA spells. As the
heterogeneity component increases, the duration of their Off-SA spells decreases but always
remain above that of the other two groups. Likewise, the duration of the SA spells increase
beyond that of the other two groups only for very high values of ν. Their steady-state reliance
on SA is thus by far the lowest.
20
5 Conclusion
Back in December 2001, the Quebec government implemented the so-called “Action Emploi”
(AE) program. It aimed at making work pay for long-term social assistance recipients. AE
offered a generous wage subsidy for up to three years to those who left social assistance (SA)
within twelve months to take a full-time job. The program was implemented on an experimental
basis for a single year. Very little research has looked into the impact of the program on the
employment history of the targeted population. Yet, based on little empirical evidence a
slightly modified version of the program was implemented on a permanent basis in May 2008.
The paper investigates the impact of the program on the work history of a large sample of
social assistance recipients. We do this by modelling the main features of the program. We
focus on the transitions on the labour market starting one year prior to the implementation
of the program and up until the end of 2005. Our empirical strategy relies on a multi-state
multi-episode transition model. The model accounts for left-censoring, for the initial conditions
problem as well as for the fixed duration of the “grace period” during which participants are
entitled not to meet the program requirements. The endogeneity of the participation status is
accounted for by treating AE as a distinct state and by allowing correlated unobserved factors
to affect the observed transitions.
Our results show that AE has indeed increased the duration of Off-SA spells and decreased
the duration of SA spells slightly. The results vary according to whether participation was
interrupted early or not. There is also some evidence that the response to the program varies
considerably with the unobserved individual characteristics. Given that only 6% of the eligible
population actually participated in the program, one can conjecture that a larger participation
rate would have translated into larger program effects. This conjecture will eventually lend
itself to investigation as the new permanent program gets more widely known and as more
data become available.
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Table 7: Log-Logistic Shape Parameters
Destination
Initial spell Subsequent spells
Origin Off-SA SA AE Off-SA SA AE AE-SA
αjk
Off-SA 1.894 1.024 0.782
(0.039) (0.258) (0.102)
SA 2.472 2.993 1.110 1.038
(0.014) (0.218) (0.074) (1.367)
AE 2.822 0.745
(0.038) (0.131)
AE-SA† 1.930
(0.103)
Destination
Initial spell Subsequent spells
Origin Off-SA SA AE Off-SA SA AE AE-SA
κjk (see note)
Off-SA 11.486 52.866 1.277
(0.419) (1.277) (0.023)
SA 0.208 0.000 4.113 0.012
(0.002) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000)
AE 0.507 59.672
(0.010) (6.922)
AE-SA† 38.639
(1.698)
† The parameter is constant across states of origin.
Note: All the κjk parameters are multiplied by 1000 to ease reading. They are all statistically significant.
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Table 8: Simulation Results: Observed Heterogeneity†
Age
20 30 35 40 50
Mean duration Off-SA 18.6 19.9 20.3 21.6 22.4
Mean duration SA 30.9 31.1 31.1 31.1 30.6
% Participants 6.1 6.0 6.0 7.3 4.0
% time off SA 28.1 28.5 28.5 29.9 30.8
% time on SA 70.5 70.1 70.4 68.2 68.3
% time on AE 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.9 0.9
Average # Spells 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
Education
10 12 14 16 18
Mean duration Off-SA 16.6 16.8 16.2 15.2 14.9
Mean duration SA 29.5 29.4 28.0 27.2 26.3
% Participants 6.2 5.5 5.9 7.4 7.3
% time off SA 24.8 25.7 26.2 26.2 26.8
% time on SA 73.6 73.0 72.4 72.3 71.8
% time on AE 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3
Average # Spells 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.3
# of Children
1 2 3 4 5
Mean duration Off-SA 16.2 16.9 17.7 18.9 18.2
Mean duration SA 29.4 29.3 30.0 29.7 30.1
% Participants 6.9 5.5 5.6 5.0 5.3
% time off SA 24.9 25.8 26.0 27.6 26.6
% time on SA 73.5 72.9 72.9 71.4 72.1
% time on AE 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
Average # Spells 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7
† Based on 1000 replications, average-modal individual
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Table 9: Simulation Results: Hypothetical Individual With and Without AE†
(A) Education with AE
10 12 14 16 18
Mean duration Off-SA 21.6 21.2 20.7 20.3 18.9
Mean duration SA 30.9 29.8 30.0 29.2 28.6
% time off SA 29.3 30.2 29.5 30.0 28.6
% time on SA 70.7 69.8 70.5 70.0 71.4
(B) Education without AE
10 12 14 16 18
Mean duration Off-SA 22.3 21.2 19.6 19.9 19.7
Mean duration SA 30.6 30.1 30.3 29.9 28.8
% time off SA 30.1 29.3 27.7 29.0 29.1
% time on SA 69.9 70.7 72.3 71.0 70.9
Difference between (A) and (B)
10 12 14 16 18
Mean duration Off-SA -0.7 0.0 1.1 0.4 -0.8
Mean duration SA 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.2
% time off SA -0.8 0.9 1.8 1.0 -0.5
% time on SA 0.8 -0.9 -1.8 -1.0 0.5
† Based on 1000 replications, average-modal individual
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